

**COMP90043 Cryptography and Security**  
**Semester 2, 2020, Workshop Week 9**

**Message authentication**

1. What is the main difference between hash functions and Message Authentication codes?
2. What are some threats associated with a direct digital signature scheme?
3. List ways in which secret keys can be distributed to two communicating parties.
4. What is the difference between a session key and a master key?
5. What is a nonce?
6. Explain the problems with key management and how it affects symmetric cryptography?

**Symmetric Key Distribution Protocol**

1. Consider a variation of the symmetric key distribution protocol discussed in the lecture involving  $n$  users and a KDC. Here every user decides to generate random number themselves for the communication they seek to start. All users share a master key with the KDC, all communications can be observed by all users.

The steps are as follows:

- (a) A generates a random session key  $K_s$  and sends to the KDC his identity  $ID_A$ , destination  $ID_B$ , and  $E(K_A, K_s)$ .
- (b) KDC responds by sending  $E(K_B, K_s)$  to A.
- (c) A sends  $E(K_s, M)$  together with  $E(K_B, K_s)$  to B.
- (d) B knows  $K_B$ , thus decrypts  $E(K_B, K_s)$ , to get  $K_s$  and will subsequently use  $K_s$  to decrypt  $E(K_s, M)$  to get M.

Is this secure?

2. Consider the following protocol, designed to let A and B decide on a fresh, shared session key  $K_s$ . We assume that they already share a long-term key  $K_{AB}$ .

$$A \rightarrow B : ID_A, N_A$$

$$B \rightarrow A : E(K_{AB}, [N_A, K_s])$$

$$A \rightarrow B : E(K_s, N_A)$$

- (a) Why would A and B believe after the protocol ran that they share  $K_s$  with each other?  
A believes that she shares  $K_s$  with B since ...  
B believes that he shares  $K_s$  with A since ...

- (b) Why would they believe that this shared key  $K_s$  is fresh?  
A believes that  $K_s$  is fresh since ...  
B believes that  $K_s$  is fresh since ...
- (c) Assume now that A starts a run of this protocol with B. However, the connection is intercepted by the adversary C. Show how C can start a new run of the protocol using reflection, causing A to believe that she has agreed on a fresh key with B (in spite of the fact that he has only been communicating with C). Thus, in particular, the belief in (a) is false.
- (d) Propose a modification of the protocol that prevents this attack.